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Qualitative research is undergoing a surge in 
popularity in the medical literature, as shown by 
the growth in the proportion of qualitative stud‑
ies in the BMJ over the past two decades (figure). 
Though many qualitative studies are not obviously 
philosophical—for example, the authors might 
simply want to determine what doctors think of 
clinical targets—one school of thought claims that 
qualitative methods are derived from a construc‑
tivist philosophy. This view is widely accepted in 
several disciplines, including nursing.1‑3 A recent 
series of papers published in the BMJ,4‑9 designed 
to help readers to critically appraise qualitative 
research, devotes the whole of the first article to 
explaining the philosophical differences between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches.4 Kuper 
and colleagues state that the differences between 
qualitative and quantitative methods “run deeper 
than the presence and absence of numbers,” and 
that “most qualitative researchers today share 
a different belief about knowledge, called ‘con‑
structivism,’” which is at odds with the “theoreti‑
cal underpinnings” of quantitative methods.4 So 
what is constructivism, exactly?
Constructivism
The various descriptions of the constructivist 
ph ilo sophical framework share the view that 
“individuals create, negotiate, and interpret 
meanings for their actions and for the social 
situations in which they exist.”4 In most versions 
there is no such thing as an objective truth ex isting 
outside or p re‑existing the observer, objectivity is 
a “chimera,”10 and there are “multiple subjec‑
tive realities,” rather than a single objective one. 
Constructivism is contrasted with positivism, a 
philosophy that (according to constructivists) is 
the basis of quantitative research, including ran‑
domised controlled trials. The constructivist point 
of view is that positivism assumes an absolute 
truth, a single objective reality, and a detached, 
neutral standpoint from which this objective real‑
ity can be studied. Positivism is always portrayed 
as discredited.
Positivism and constructivism are said to be 
alternative paradigms, a term used to refer to the 
basic beliefs, or “axioms,”11 that dictate methodo‑
logical preferences. The main contrasts between 
the constructivist and positivist paradigms (again, 
according to constructivists) are summarised in 
the table. This is adapted from the work of L incoln 
and Guba (box), which has been enormously 
influential.
Alternative views
Lincoln and Guba, and those influenced by 
them, insist that positivists and constructivists 
have different basic beliefs on the nature of real‑
ity, knowledge, causation, and so on. But where 
do these beliefs come from? According to Lin‑
coln and Guba, they are “arbitrary.” They can 
be “assumed for any reason,” and are “not self‑
evidently true.” They “must be accepted at face 
value,” and “cannot be tested for truthfulness 
against some external norm.” They “represent 
the ultimate benchmark against which everything 
else is tested.”11 12 This arbitrariness entails that all 
methodological decisions, according to Lincoln 
and Guba, depend on the antecedent beliefs of 
the researcher. If the researchers reject the “sin‑
gle, tangible reality,” and believe that objectivity 
is impossible, they are constructivists and should 
adopt interpretative methods. They need not pro‑
vide any justification for their beliefs, because 
the beliefs can be “assumed for any reason,” and 
“must be accepted at face value.” There are no 
philosophical or empirical constraints on their 
selection of a paradigm. On this view, the valid‑
ity of empirical inquiry always and inevitably 
depends not on evidence or argument, but on the 
arbitrary predilections of the researchers. It means 
that method is not accountable to anything other 
than personal preference. This cannot be right.
Assessment of constructivist beliefs
The individual “basic beliefs” that define the con‑
structivist paradigm are also questionable. There 
is insufficient space to consider all, so we focus on 
three constructivist tenets that are often referred 
to, but are recycled without interrogation or suf‑
ficient scepticism.
Fragmentation and holism
The view attributed to positivism, that reality 
is fragmented into variables, is a straw man. No 
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Basic beliefs attributed to positivism and constructivism
Belief Positivism Constructivism
Reality  
(fragmentation versus holism)
There is a single tangible reality, fragmented 
into variables
There are multiple constructed realities that can 
be studied only holistically
Knowledge  
(knower and known)
The inquirer and the object of inquiry are 
independent. A true, or approximately true, 
understanding of the object is possible
Knower and known are inseparable. There are 
no independent, objective criteria by which the 
truth can be achieved
Generalisation The aim of inquiry is to develop context free 
generalisations, which are true everywhere 
and at all times
Context free generalisation is not possible, but 
findings are transferable on the basis of similarity 
between the sample and future cases
Causation  
(cause and meaning)
Every action can be explained as the result 
of a cause, and the effects of action can be 
tested experimentally
It is impossible to distinguish cause and effect. 
Qualitative inquiry aims at understanding the so 
called inside meanings of the actors concerned
Values Inquiry is value free and can be guaranteed to 
be so by the use of an objective methodology. 
The inquirer aims at emotional detachment
Inquiry is value bound. The personal values of 
the inquirer must be consistent with the theory 
and the method being used
Method Inquiry is experimental and quantitative, and 
aims at verification
Inquiry is mainly qualitative and interpretive, 
and aims at trustworthiness
Adapted from Lincoln and Guba.10-12
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one believes it, and classification into types is 
something that all researchers, both quantita-
tive and qualitative, do. Variables are a product 
of measurement procedures; they are not part of 
the structure of reality. In any case, the idea that 
anything can be studied holistically is debatable, 
since any description of the world must leave 
things out. Such is the case with models, the main 
vehicle of representation in science.13 Models can 
be abstract (mathematical models), simulations 
(computer models), or physically realised (the DNA 
molecule, maps). The mechanisms identified can 
be physical (gases as collections of particles in 
constant random motion), psychological (health 
belief model), biological (natural selection), or 
sociological (Goffman’s dramaturgical model of 
social action), among other possibilities.14
Paradoxically, models are useful because they 
omit things. A model represents only one aspect of 
the world, and the resources it uses are commensu-
rate with that specific purpose. It makes no attempt 
to be global. The London Underground map, for 
example, represents the sequence of stations on 
different lines. It omits anything and everything 
else. It is not a comprehensive depiction of the 
network, let alone a holistic map of London. The 
map is intended to represent London from a lim-
ited perspective, and for a highly specific purpose: 
finding your way round the underground system. 
Likewise, the wave theory of light is useful when 
dealing with refraction, and the photon theory 
when designing solar energy panels. The same 
applies to descriptions of all kinds. Representa-
tion is intrinsically partial.13 It omits those features 
of reality that do not serve a specific purpose. It is 
not, and cannot be, holistic. This is precisely why 
a model, and every other form of description, is 
so informative. Holism, in any form of inquiry, is 
neither obtainable nor desirable.
Knower and known
The constructivist idea that the knower cannot 
be separated from the known implies that there 
are no independent criteria for determining 
whether a particular claim is true; and construc-
tivists reject concepts such as validity, reliability, 
and objectivity out of hand. In general, they see 
objectivity as an “Enlightenment prescription,”10 
predicated on the view that the world is “distinct 
from those who would know” it. For truth they 
substitute credibility, and propose that the test of 
qualitative research is resonance: “the extent that 
research findings have meaning for the reader.”9
What this view overlooks is that human beings 
are apt to succumb to cognitive illusions. People 
have a striking propensity to misconstrue data,15 
and to discount information that contradicts 
antecedent beliefs. The history of objectivity is a 
history of spotting various ways in which we get 
things wrong16 and devising measures for reduc-
ing the risk that we will do so.17 It is the problem 
of fallibility, the perpetual danger of succumbing 
to error, that drives the concept of objectivity, not 
an Enlightenment prejudice. To dismiss this his-
tory, and to suggest that there are no independ-
ent criteria for distinguishing between how it is 
and how it seems, is to imply that nothing can 
be done to reduce the risk of being mistaken, 
deceived, or led astray. Objectivity is a corrective 
strategy. It is not a philosophical preference or an 
instrument of authority.
As for resonance, it is a poor test of whether 
findings are valid (that is, worthy of being acted 
on). Many things have resonance, even if they 
are false, misleading, or expressions of wish-
ful thinking. The real test of a research study is 
not the extent to which it confirms the reader’s 
preconceptions, but the extent to which the evi-
dence confirms or disconfirms a theory.
Cause versus meaning
Despite its centrality to constructivism, the con-
cept of meaning is rarely scrutinised. It is largely 
taken for granted and meanings are assumed 
to be transparent. However, an extensive social 
psychology literature suggests the opposite. In 
particular, mental states—motives, desires, and 
beliefs—are often opaque to the person experi-
encing them.18 Individuals are not necessarily 
a reliable guide to their own preferences, rea-
sons for action, views, and opinions. This opac-
ity applies even to the immediate contents of 
experience, which can be indeterminate; and 
the brain typically compensates for this inde-
terminacy, preconsciously, by fabricating both 
sensory data and psychological states.19 People’s 
accounts of their decisions, including when and 
how they make them, are equally unreliable. The 
sense of personal identity is no more secure, but 
the brain creates fictions in order to maintain the 
illusion that there is a unified agent operating in 
a meaningful world.20 Similarly, we confabulate 
past events, past intentions, and past motives 
in order to compensate for the gaps with which 
memory is riddled.21 22 We are, to a considerable 
degree, “strangers to ourselves.”18 Any approach 
to qualitative research that takes no account of 
these findings, and that treats the meanings 
reported by respondents as authoritative, must 
be regarded with suspicion. It is impossible, 
without further inquiry, to rely on what people 
say about themselves, their experience, or their 
interpretations of what has happened to them.
Qualitative method
In our view, it is neither necessary nor desirable 
that qualitative research should align itself with a 
particular philosophy. We do not accept the claim 
that the quantitative/qualitative distinction runs 
“deeper than the presence or absence of num-
bers.”4 Qualitative and quantitative methods are 
only alternative tools, used for different tasks in 
research (as saws and screwdrivers are alternative 
tools used for different tasks in carpentry). They 
have no philosophical implications. They are fit 
for purpose in a variety of situations. Pursuing this 
line of thought, we will close with a few brief notes 
on the alternative to constructivism.
Words and numbers should be conceived as 
alternative forms of measurement.23 They are both 
outputs of a causal interaction between the world 
and an instrument, whether it be a thermometer, a 
weighing scale, or a series of unconstrained inter-
view questions. Just as a thermometer measures 
temperature using a calibrated numerical scale, 
so an interview measures experience, beliefs, and 
attitudes using a calibrated linguistic scale. In the 
qualitative case, the scale comprises the sentences 
of a language, capable of discriminating between 
one belief, or one experience, and another. This 
view accommodates the idea that no one has 
privileged access to his or her mental states, or to 
their meanings. Self report data are just that: first 
person data for analysis by the researcher.19
Lincoln and Guba, and Naturalistic Inquiry
Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba, two education 
researchers, are largely responsible for the 
widespread acceptance of the constructivist 
position in contemporary qualitative research. 
Their 1985 monograph, Naturalistic Inquiry,11 
has attracted over 15 000 citations (Google 
Scholar). Lincoln and Guba have been 
immensely influential in several social science 
disciplines, including nursing research. 
Their concepts—such as transferability and 
trustworthiness—are adopted by researchers 
who ostensibly use a wide range of qualitative 
approaches, including hermeneutics, 
ethnography, narrative inquiry, action research, 
grounded theory, and at least three distinct 
types of phenomenology. 
PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RESEARCH 
• Qualitative research is often described as a 
paradigm in which the objective is to determine 
meanings, and trace the way in which they are 
created, negotiated, and interpreted.
• The social psychology literature indicates that 
access to meaning is deeply problematic and 
failure to separate the knower from the known is 
fraught with inferential risk.
• There is no philosophical basis for shoe horning 
scientific methods into paradigms in the form of 
immutable packages of beliefs about the nature 
of knowledge and reality.
• Models, the primary form of representation in 
science as in any form of inquiry, depict a single 
aspect of the world and propose an explanation 
for it.
• No form of description can be holistic.
• There is no philosophical difference between 
qualitative and quantitative studies, both of 
which must employ models and measurement to 
represent the world.
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Words and numbers are also among the 
resources than can be used to devise models. 
Numbers are incorporated in mathematical models 
governing the behaviour of a system (although the 
system is itself a model abstracted from a complex 
physical reality). Similarly, words are incorporated 
in psychological, social, and organisational mod-
els, explaining the behaviour of a person, social 
group, or institution. Such models can be derived 
from first person data, but they are not restricted to 
representing people’s view of themselves.
Any particular model can explain only one facet 
of the behaviour of an individual, population, or 
system. It represents just one slice through the 
cake. Constructivist methodologists describe this 
focus on specific aspects of the world as reduction-
ist, a term they apply to quantitative research in 
general. However, the implied alternative—the 
representation of a phenomenon in all its complex-
ity—is neither possible nor desirable. Just as a map 
is useful because it excludes extraneous material, 
so a model is useful because it does not attempt to 
depict everything.13
If the distinction between quantitative and qual-
itative research is no longer a difference between 
paradigms, then the claim that concepts such as 
validity, truth, and objectivity are not applicable 
to qualitative methods is vitiated. The minimal-
ist position will be that all forms of investigation 
should incorporate procedures designed to reduce 
the risk of inferential error. In quantitative studies, 
this is achieved by, for example, experimental pro-
tocols and the error statistical canon.17 In qualita-
tive studies, there is no canonical equivalent; but 
there are procedures with a comparable function, 
such as interobserver reliability, theoretical sam-
pling, and discouraging clinicians from research-
ing their own patients. All these procedures resist 
the view that the credibility of research findings 
has something to do with the resonance they create 
in the reader.9
The development of mixed methods research 
should be welcomed (and is a symptom of the 
breakdown of paradigm thinking) even if many 
authors think that it involves the turpitude of “com-
bining paradigms,” because “qualitative research 
emphasises an inductive-subjective-contextual 
approach and quantitative research emphasises 
a deductive-objective-generalising approach.”5 
This contrast is, in our view, both unnecessary 
and incorrect. Bayesian methods, for example, are 
quantitative and generalising but also inductive, 
subjective, and contextual.24
Conclusion
Some readers may argue that what we have out-
lined is just another positivist version of qualita-
tive research. The objection makes sense only if 
the Lincoln and Guba account of paradigms is pre-
supposed; and this is precisely the framework we 
reject. We do accept the distinction between good 
fit and bad fit, between how it is and how it seems; 
but that is a distinction to which every researcher 
should be committed. Other readers may think 
that the constructivist paradigm is so implau-
sible as not to require any attempt at refutation. 
H owever, it cannot be assumed that an idea that 
has become mainstream in other disciplines will 
not gain ground in medicine. We offer our argu-
ment in order that it should not do so unopposed.
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PICTURE QUIZ  An unusual cause of stroke and hypoxia
1 The chest radiograph shows a large soft tissue opacity projected over the right 
heart border, suggestive of a pulmonary arteriovenous malformation (fig 1). 
The computed tomography pulmonary angiograph confirms the presence of a 
pulmonary arteriovenous malformation in the right middle lobe (fig 2).
2 A pulmonary arteriovenous malformation can be associated with the clinical 
features of hypoxaemia, such as cyanosis and clubbing, because of arterio-
venous shunting of deoxygenated blood and with increased risk of stroke and 
cerebral abscess owing to venous emboli passing into the arterial circulation.
3 The likely underlying condition is hereditary haemorrhagic telangiectasia, also 
known as Osler-Weber-Rendu syndrome.
4 Hereditary haemorrhagic telangiectasia is caused by mutations in genes that 
encode components of the TGF-β superfamily signalling pathways; however, 
it appears that a stimulus such as angiogenesis is required to make these 
mutations deleterious. Hereditary haemorrhagic telangiectasia has an autosomal 
dominant pattern of inheritance and manifests as a heterozygous condition; 
therefore, children with one affected parent have a 50% chance of being affected. 
Clinical manifestations may vary within families because of the variable genetic 
penetrance of the disease.
5 The Curaçao criteria are currently the mainstay of clinical diagnosis of hereditary 
haemorrhagic telangiectasia. Management involves screening for and treatment 
of arteriovenous malformations in the patient and related individuals. Genetic 
testing is also available.
ON EXAMINATION 
QUIZ
Pseudoseizures
Answer B is correct.
Fig 1 | Chest radiograph showing a 
large soft tissue opacity projected 
over the right heart border (arrows)
Fig 2 | Computed tomography 
pulmonary angiograph showing a 
pulmonary arteriovenous malformation 
in the right middle lobe (arrows)
